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IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION BANKRUPTCY 
Jill E. Family* 
ABSTRACT 
The Trump Administration is pushing an adjudicatory system on the brink over the edge.  The system designed to 
decide whether to remove (deport) individuals from the United States has longstanding problems that predate the 
Trump Administration.  Those problems are being exacerbated rather than improved.  It is time to consider the 
notion of immigration adjudication bankruptcy.   Immigration adjudication bankruptcy involves a declaration that 
the removal adjudication system is not satisfying the basic principles of administrative process: accuracy, 
acceptability, and efficiency.   This Article, a part of a symposium on executive power and immigration law, raises 
questions about when bankruptcy should be declared and examines issues surrounding the restructuring of 
immigration removal adjudication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When President Trump took over as steward for the immigration 
adjudication system, he inherited a system beset with problems and 
struggling to fulfil its core mission:  to fairly, accurately, and efficiently decide 
whether a noncitizen will be removed (deported) from the United States. 
Despite the Trump Administration’s expressed skepticism about regulatory 
power, the administration has let dysfunctional government power fester in 
immigration adjudication.1  Even worse than that, the Trump 
Administration has made the removal hearing process even less fair and 
President Trump himself has expressed that he does not believe that process 
is even necessary when it comes to immigrants.  The Administration’s views 
on immigration clearly trump any concern it has about government power 
in other regulatory contexts. 
The Trump Administration is pushing an adjudicatory system on the 
brink over the edge.  This requires consideration of immigration adjudication 
bankruptcy.  Immigration adjudication bankruptcy is a scenario where the 
system fails to serve the basic principles of administrative adjudication:  
accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability.2  Accuracy “serves as a reminder that 
the ascertainment of truth, or, more realistically, as close an approximation 
of reality as human frailty permits, is the major goal of most contested 
proceedings.”3  Efficiency is “the time, effort, and expense of elaborate 
procedures.”4  Acceptability “emphasizes the indispensable virtues of 
procedures that are considered fair by those whom they affect, as well as by 
the general public.”5   
In immigration adjudication bankruptcy, the immigration court system 
will no longer be acceptable because it will not function as an unbiased check 
on immigration enforcement officials.  The system will abandon efforts to 
separate functions and will become accountable only to the desired outcome 
 
 1 See Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 
123 (2018) (exploring the phenomenon of the role of immigration law regulation during a 
deregulatory administration).  The American Bar Association has described the immigration courts 
as “facing an existential crisis” and reports that “the current system is irredeemably dysfunctional 
and on the brink of collapse.”  2 AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, 2019 UPDATE 
REPORT:  REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2–3 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration
_system_volume_2.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT].  
 2 Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate 
Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 112 (1964).  For further discussion of Cramton’s criteria in the 
immigration law context, see Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 633–47 (2009). 
3 Cramton, supra note 2, at 112. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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of policymakers who publicly favor removal and denigrate process.  As a 
result of its descent into unacceptability, the immigration adjudication system 
will become a façade of justice and will exist to put a stamp of approval on 
the decisions of immigration prosecutors.  It also will become more 
inaccurate as it does not seek whatever outcome the law requires in an 
individual case.  The system will place such a high value on efficiency6 that 
the values of accuracy and acceptability will be abandoned.    
This Article, a part of a symposium on executive power and immigration, 
will examine the state of the immigration adjudication system before the 
Trump Administration, as well as the Trump Administration’s efforts that 
have further damaged the system.  From there, the Article will explain that 
the immigration adjudication system is in a precarious state and is being 
pushed toward bankruptcy.  At what point should the system be declared 
bankrupt?  If it is bankrupt, how should it be reorganized?  While a clean 
slate may have some appeal, the Trump Administration is poised to rebuild 
a system that is fundamentally opposed to the idea of process for noncitizens 
and one that embraces government prosecution power at the expense of 
administrative law values.   
I.  IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION BEFORE THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
The system designed to adjudicate whether an individual will be removed 
from the United States faces major challenges.  Both Democratic and 
Republican administrations have failed to course correct over time; the 
system has been inefficient and dissatisfying for decades.  Therefore, all of 
the blame for what ails immigration adjudication should not be laid at the 
feet of the Trump Administration.  This Part will describe the long-term 
challenges facing immigration adjudication and its state at the time of 
President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. 
The long-term challenges exist against a constitutional backdrop where 
the application of the Constitution’s provisions take place in the specialized 
context of immigration law.  For example, the application of the Due Process 
Clause may depend on the location of the noncitizen.  The Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”7  The clause applies to 
all persons and not just citizens.  The Supreme Court has held that the Due 
Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, even if the 
person is in the United States without permission.8  The Supreme Court, 
 
6 The type of efficiency implicated in immigration adjudication bankruptcy is one where speed is 
most valued, but only if the speedy decision results in removal. 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true that aliens who 
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however, has held that the Due Process Clause applies differently in the case 
of removal upon application for admission (at the border) versus removal 
after entry (even if unlawful) into the United States.9  If the applicant for 
admission is a returning lawful permanent resident, however, the Supreme 
Court has held that the individual does not lose his or her protection under 
the Due Process Clause as long as the person’s absence from the United 
States was innocent, casual, and brief.10 
When the Due Process Clause applies, the exact contours of its protection 
in immigration adjudication varies, and some questions are unresolved or 
evolving.  For example, there is no statutory right to government-funded 
counsel in immigration court.11  So far, the Supreme Court has not held that 
the Constitution requires otherwise.12   
Congress has created a statutory scheme of immigration adjudication 
against this at times unresolved constitutional background.  Congress 
designed the adjudication system to determine whether someone applying 
for admission at the border should be admitted and whether someone who 
has reached the interior should be removed.  The system is structured to 
diffuse functions among the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security.13  Immigration judges, who are attorney employees of 
the Department of Justice, are the trial-level adjudicators.14  They preside 
over immigration court.  During a hearing before an immigration judge, a 
lawyer who works for the Department of Homeland Security represents the 
government.15  The foreign national respondent may be represented if the 
 
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”). 
 9 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (stating that “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”).  
 10 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 29–32 (1982); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1963). 
 11 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (authorizing use of counsel “at no expense to the Government”). 
 12 However, a lower court held in 2010 that there is an obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to 
provide representation to foreign nationals with mental disabilities in immigration court.  See 
Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1051–52 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  After that decision, 
the Department of Justice announced a policy to provide counsel to immigrants with serious mental 
disabilities.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious 
Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-
justice-and-department-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-unrepresented (last updated July 
15, 2015).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2018 agreed to hear en 
banc a case challenging the lack of government-appointed counsel for children in immigration 
court.  See C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 13 See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). 
 15 Who We Are: Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T: OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL LEGAL 
ADVISOR (OPLA), https://www.ice.gov/opla#wcm-survey-target-id (last updated Mar. 6, 2019) 
(explaining that over 1,100 attorneys work for the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (“OPLA”) 
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and that OPLA is the “exclusive representative 
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individual can arrange for representation on their own.16  Decisions of 
immigration judges may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals,17 
which is a part of the Department of Justice.  Through a petition for review 
process, a United States Court of Appeals may have judicial review of the 
final administrative decision regarding removability, but the availability of 
judicial review is limited.18 
Immigration judges are administrative judges; they are not 
administrative law judges.19  Despite a regulatory command to use their 
independent judgment in adjudicating cases, they lack the job protections of 
administrative law judges, who are more protected from agency influence.20  
Traditionally, the hiring of administrative law judges occurred through an 
independent agency called the Office of Personnel Management and their 
firing through another, the Merit Systems Protection Board.21  The pay of 
administrative law judges is not dependent on a performance review.22  
When a neutral entity makes employment decisions and pay does not depend 
on pleasing the agency boss, that promotes independent decision-making.  
By contrast, immigration adjudicators are hired and fired by the agency they 
work for, the Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice also sets the 
conditions of immigration judge employment. 
One long-standing objection to the role of immigration adjudicators is 
that they lack adequate decisional independence.23  There have been several 
proposals to make immigration adjudication more independent.24  
 
of [the Department of Homeland Security] in immigration removal proceedings”).   
 16 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
 17 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c) (2014). 
 18 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012). 
 19 Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647 (2016).  
 20 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2014). 
 21  But see Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 135 (July 10, 2018).   On July 10, 2018, President 
Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,843 which excepted Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) 
from the Competitive Service selection process, through which they were previously appointed to 
federal agencies, and required all new ALJ appointments be made into the Excepted Service.  Id. 
See also Barnett, supra note 19, at 1653–56. 
 22 Barnett, supra note 19, at 1655 (stating that ALJs pay is set by statute and regulation but not 
performance reviews). 
 23 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 
(2006).  Professor Legomsky focused his analysis of immigration adjudicator independence on “the 
threat of personal consequences for the adjudicator.”  Id. at 389.  Professor Legomsky explained:  
  Under this constraint, the case is presumed to be one that the law clearly allows the 
adjudicator to decide, and there is no attempt by a superior to directly dictate the outcome 
of that case, but there are general threats, real or perceived, that decisions which displease 
an executive official could pose professional risks for the adjudicator.  Those risks might 
include dismissal, reassignment to a less desirable position, nonrenewal of the appointment 
at the expiration of a fixed term, or loss of compensation. 
  Id.   
 24 There are proposals, for example, to recreate immigration adjudication as an Article I court with 
greater autonomy from the Executive Branch.  See, e.g., Christine Lockhart Poarch, The FBA’s 
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Immigration adjudicators must decide cases worried about what the 
Attorney General, the country’s top law enforcement official, thinks of their 
decision-making record.25  Additionally, the Attorney General has the power 
to certify removal cases to himself if he does not like the work product of the 
immigration adjudication system.26  Therefore, even if independent decision-
making occurs, the Attorney General may fairly easily overrule it.    
Concerns about the independence of immigration adjudicators are not 
solely abstract.  In the past, immigration judge positions have been 
politicized.  During the George W. Bush Administration, the Department of 
Justice Office of Inspector General found that there was unlawful politicized 
hiring of immigration judges.27  Also, President George W. Bush’s Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft, fired members of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
in a move that was seen as eliminating board members with lenient 
reputations.28  
Adding to the restrictions on immigration adjudicator independence is 
substantive immigration law itself.  The substantive law that immigration 
adjudicators are called on to apply leaves them little room to judge—that is, 
to exercise much independent judgment about the result in any given case.  
 
Proposal for the Creation of a Federal Immigration Court, FED. LAW., Apr. 2014, at 33, 
http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/Government-Relations/CH16/Proposed-Article-I-
Immigration-Court.aspx; AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 9, at 6-16 to 6-17 (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_012510.authcheckda
m.pdf; AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION COURT REFORM 
(2018), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/74919; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1640 (2010) (recommending that 
immigration judges become administrative law judges and be relocated from the Department of 
Justice to an independent tribunal within the Executive Branch).  The United States Government 
Accountability Office (“USGAO”) collected suggestions for structural reform in a report addressing 
the case backlog.  U.S.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT 
AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 73–87 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf.  
 25  Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein remarked to a class of new immigration judges: “[I]n 
addition to your adjudicative function––finding facts and applying laws––you are a member of the 
executive branch.  You follow lawful instructions from the Attorney General, and you share a duty 
to enforce the law.”  Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opening Remarks 
at Investiture of 31 Newly Appointed Immigration Judges (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-opening-
remarks-investiture-31-newly. 
 26 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (1958). 
 27  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY 
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135 
(2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf.  The investigation found that staff 
members in the Office of the Attorney General improperly subjected candidates for certain career 
positions to the same politically based evaluation they used on candidates for political positions, in 
violation of federal law and Department policy.  Id.; see also Family, supra note 2, at 604–08 
 28 Family, supra note 2, at 602–03, 605. 
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The immigration statutes are so strict and unforgiving that there is little room 
for immigration judges to consider equities.29  For example, if a foreign 
national is convicted of what is considered an aggravated felony for 
immigration law purposes (an “aggravated felony” is a statutory term of art 
that encompasses crimes that are not aggravated or felonies), that individual 
is automatically ineligible for almost all kinds of relief from removal.30  Also, 
there is little proportionality in immigration law when it comes to assigning 
the consequences of an immigration law violation.31  The “punishment” is 
almost always removal.32  There is no graduated system of consequences.  No 
matter the severity of the immigration violation, the same consequence 
applies.   
Even when an individual is eligible for relief from removal, the statutory 
prerequisites to relief present steep hurdles.  For example, to be eligible for 
cancellation of removal, some individuals must show that their removal will 
cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying United 
States citizen or green card-holding close relative.33   Exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship is hardship that is substantially beyond what is 
expected when a family is separated because of immigration law.34  In other 
words, the separation of a parent from a United States citizen child on its 
own is meaningless.  The separation must go beyond even extreme hardship 
to rise to the level of exceptionally and extremely unusual hardship.   
Another longstanding problem in immigration adjudication is a 
tremendous backlog of cases awaiting adjudication.  The backlog of cases in 
immigration court has climbed steadily since 2009 and rose throughout the 
Obama Administration.35  Prior to then, the backlog remained under 
200,000 cases.36  In 2009, the backlog reached 223,809.37  By 2012, it 
 
 29 See Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing Immigration Removal and Benefits 
Adjudication, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N. OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 45, 54–64 (2011). 
 30 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated felony”); see also AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL, AGGRAVATED FELONIES: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/aggravated-felonies-overview (“[A]n 
‘aggravated felony’ is simply an offense that Congress sees fit to label as such, and today includes 
many nonviolent and seemingly minor offenses.”). 
 31 See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009) (“Proportionality 
is conspicuously absent from the legal framework for immigration sanctions.  One sanction—
deportation—is the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation.”). 
 32 Id. 
 33 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 34 In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 56 (B.I.A. 2001).  
 35 Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of January 2019, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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reached 325,044.38  Two years later, it reached 408,037.39  By 2016, the 
backlog crossed over 500,000 to 516,031.40  It has continued to grow under 
the Trump Administration, reaching 629,051 in 2017.41  The most current 
estimate tops 800,000.42  For cases where the noncitizen respondent is not 
detained, it is common for that individual to wait years for a hearing.43  The 
number of immigration judges has increased, but it has not been enough to 
reduce the backlog.44   
The lack of lawyers for noncitizens compounds the backlog.  One study 
concluded that only thirty-seven percent of individuals in removal 
proceedings are represented.45  This means that the majority of individuals 
are representing themselves.  This affects not only the fairness of the 
proceedings, but also affects efficiency.46  Represented immigrants spend less 
time asking for continuances and are more likely to appear at hearings.47   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.  The number could be over one million, however, if one counts the cases former Attorney 
General Sessions placed back on the active dockets of the immigration courts through his efforts to 
curtail the use of docket control measures.  Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 6, 2018), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/; see also infra, notes 103–09. 
 43 See Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of January 2019, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/ 
court_backlog/apprep_backlog_avgdays.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (showing that, as of January 
2019, the average wait is 746 days).   
 44 The Administrative Conference of the United States has recognized the need for additional 
resources for immigration adjudication.  See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2012–3: IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
ADJUDICATION 3, 5 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012-3.pdf.  In 
2012, there were 264 immigration judges and now there are approximately 400.  LENNI B. BENSON 
& RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
ADJUDICATION 6 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-
Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (reporting 
264 immigration judges in 2012); Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 
21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge (stating that there 
are approximately 400 immigration judges).   
 45 Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 7, 16 (2015). 
 46 Id. at 75. 
 47 Id.   
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The lack of lawyers also affects a noncitizen’s ability to succeed in 
immigration court.48  Representation means “dramatically more successful 
case outcomes” for noncitizens.49  The Department of Justice historically has 
funded a Legal Orientation Program to help address the efficiency problems 
caused by a lack of representation.50  The program does not provide 
individual representation, but it does provide for group informational 
sessions for individuals who are detained during their removal proceedings 
and also helps to match pro bono referrals.51   
Against this background, many have found fault with the quality of 
adjudication provided in the immigration adjudication system.  For example, 
in 2006, President George W. Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales 
conducted a review of immigration judges’ behavior that followed a rash of 
reports of inadequate immigration judge work-product.52  United States 
Courts of Appeals judges have identified incidents of bias and intimidating 
and demeaning behavior towards respondents.53  Other studies have made 
recommendations on how to improve immigration adjudication, including 
examining the use of video hearings and internal court management 
processes.54   
Federal courts of appeals judges only see some of the work-product of the 
immigration adjudication system.  This is because, in 1996, Congress 
reimagined judicial review over immigration administrative adjudication.55  
For example, Congress eliminated judicial review over questions of fact and 
discretionary determinations in many removal cases.56  Congress also 
shortened the time to file a petition for review to thirty days.57  
 
 
 
 48 Id. at 9, 57; see also JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK IMMIGRANT 
FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION ON FAMILY AND 
COMMUNITY UNITY 5–6 (2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/new-york-immigrant-
family-unity-project-evaluation (finding that a universal representation project in New York City 
substantially increased the success rate for foreign nationals in that immigration court). 
 49 Eagly & Shafer, supra note 45, at 57. 
 50  ABA Report, supra note 1, at 5-18 to 5-19. 
 51 Legal Orientation Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/legal-orientation-program.   
 52 See Family, supra note 2, at 601–04. 
 53 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that immigration 
adjudication had fallen “below the minimum standards of legal justice”). 
 54 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 24; BENSON & WHEELER, supra 
note 44, at 88–89; Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 933, 933 
(2015). 
 55 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012). 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. 
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The problems described above are only a part of the immigration 
adjudication story.  Focus on the problems within the immigration courts 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals provides an incomplete picture of the 
state of immigration adjudication before the Trump Administration.  This is 
because the majority of removal adjudications do not take place in 
immigration court.58  Through various diversions, opportunities for a 
hearing before an immigration judge are actually limited for those facing 
removal.  Through expedited removal, various waivers, and the 
criminalization of immigration law, many are locked out of immigration 
court.   
Expedited removal is a statutory process that diverts individuals from 
immigration court who are inadmissible either because they lack proper 
documentation, such as a valid passport or visa, or because they have made 
a misrepresentation in the process of applying for admission.59  If an 
individual is inadmissible under one of those two grounds and is encountered 
at or within 100 miles of the border within fourteen days of entry, the 
individual is subject to expedited removal.60  The individual will not receive 
a hearing before an immigration judge.61  Instead, a front-line officer working 
for the Department of Homeland Security will decide whether to remove the 
foreign national.62  That decision is subject only to supervisory review within 
the Department of Homeland Security.63  Expedited removal, as its name 
suggests, happens quickly with less process.  It also lacks separation of 
functions protections because the same agency employee prosecutes and 
adjudicates. 
If the applicant expresses fear of returning to his or her home country 
during the expedited removal process, the individual is due a credible fear 
hearing under the statute.64  If the individual shows that he or she has a 
credible fear of returning to his or her home country, the person is extracted 
from the expedited removal process and an asylum hearing is scheduled 
 
 58 ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1–14 (reporting that the majority of removals are obtained outside 
of the immigration court process); see Family, supra note 2, at 633–44 (analyzing the variety of 
diversions from immigration court); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2017) (stating that many removal orders against noncitizens never reach 
immigration courts); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2014) (explaining that various removal procedures have been 
implemented to deport an individual without a court hearing). 
 59 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012). 
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., DHS Streamlines 
Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.fosterquan.com/news/ 
furtherexpeditedremoval.pdf.  
 61  8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 62  Id. 
 63 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (2018). 
 64 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
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before an immigration judge.65  At that point the diversion ends and the 
individual enters the immigration court system.  This credible fear process is 
meant to protect those with credible asylum claims from expedited removal 
and to preserve an opportunity for an asylum hearing.   
For those who do not express a fear of returning home, those who do not 
pass the credible fear interview, or those who are wrongly denied a credible 
fear interview, expedited removal represents the beginning and the end of 
immigration adjudication.  This minimal adjudication features quick 
decision-making by low-ranking border officers in an extremely informal 
setting.  Additionally, judicial review of an expedited removal decision is 
severely limited.66  
Individuals are also diverted from the immigration court system through 
various waivers.  For example, the government may encourage a noncitizen 
to enter into a stipulated order of removal.67  In this agreement, a noncitizen 
agrees that he or she should be removed and agrees to waive any rights to a 
hearing before an immigration judge.68  
Another example of a waiver of rights to adjudication before an 
immigration judge is included in the application to travel to the United States 
under the Visa Waiver Program.  Under the Visa Waiver Program, nationals 
of certain countries may travel to the United States to visit without the hassle 
of first visiting a United States Consulate abroad to obtain a visa.69  Travelers 
under the Visa Waiver Program may simply board a plane with a passport.  
To use the Visa Waiver Program, however, an individual must agree to 
waive rights to contest any determination made by a front-line officer about 
the individual’s admissibility into the United States.70  The only exception is 
that if the person applies for asylum, the adjudication waiver does not 
apply.71  This waiver is far reaching because courts have held it not only 
applies to any challenges to the decision whether to admit a person upon 
arrival, but it continues in force beyond that initial determination.72  If 
someone is admitted under the Visa Waiver Program and then is later 
ordered removed on some other ground, that person has no right to 
 
 65 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (2012).   
 67 JENNIFER LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS i, iii (2011), 
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/259893/doc/ 
slspublic/Deportation-Without-Due-Process-2011-09.pdf; Family, supra note 2, at 616–17; Jennifer 
Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration 
Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 478 (2013).  
 68 Family, supra note 2, at 616–17. 
 69 8 U.S.C. §§ 1187(a), (c) (2012). 
 70 Family, supra note 2, at 612–14. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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challenge the removal decision in immigration court.73  
The criminalization of immigration law has also led to diversions from 
the immigration court system.  Most of immigration law is civil law, but there 
are some federal immigration-related crimes, such as unlawful entry.74  If an 
individual crossed the border without permission, the government has the 
discretion to place that individual into the criminal justice system.  In the 
criminal justice system, the noncitizen will appear in federal court to answer 
to the charge of committing a federal crime.  The adjudication of the criminal 
charge does not inherently dispose of any civil immigration violation and a 
separate hearing before an immigration judge is necessary to adjudicate 
whether an individual will be removed from the United States.  However, 
immigration defendants in federal court may waive rights to an immigration 
court hearing as a condition of a plea bargain in the criminal justice system.75  
By stipulating to removal, an individual is diverted from immigration court 
because a hearing before an immigration judge is no longer necessary.76   
Another criminalization diversion applies to foreign nationals who do not 
have lawful permanent resident (green card) status and are convicted of an 
aggravated felony.77  These individuals are subject to administrative removal 
and under the statute receive no hearing before an immigration judge.78  A 
foreign national without a green card may be someone without permission 
to be in the United States, but it also could be someone with lawful temporary 
permission to be in the United States, such as a student or temporary worker. 
For these individuals, a low-level employee of the Department of Homeland 
Security decides whether an aggravated felony has been committed based on 
paper submissions.   
 
 
 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 627–32. 
 75 Id.; see also Donna Lee Elm et al., Immigration Defense Waivers in Federal Criminal Plea Agreements, 69 
MERCER L. REV. 839, 841, 844–48 (2018) (reviewing the language of immigration waivers from 
various jurisdictions in the United States and noting that “federal criminal prosecution is now 
routinely used as part of border enforcement strategy”); Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line 
Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 526 (2010) (describing a case with an 
undocumented defendant who requested a removal hearing before an immigration judge rather 
than accepting deportation as part of his plea deal).   
 76 Not all of those charged with a federal immigration crime are eligible for a hearing before an 
immigration judge.  Many are subject to expedited removal and reinstatement of removal.  But for 
those who would be eligible, a stipulation of removal eliminates the opportunity. 
 77 The term “aggravated felony” as used in immigration law is overly broad.  While it does include 
serious crimes such as murder and rape, it also sweeps in offenses like shoplifting.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43) (2012); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.   
 78 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2012). 
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A holistic view of the state of immigration adjudication must consider 
these diversions.  Adjudication in the form of a hearing before an 
immigration judge has not been guaranteed or even the norm for many.  
These diversions predate the Trump Administration and continue to be 
used. 
The immigration adjudication system has been troubled through various 
presidential administrations.  Immigration adjudicators have lacked 
decisional independence and have been called on to apply substantive law 
that is harsh, is complex and lacks proportionality.  Because there is no right 
to government-funded counsel in immigration court, there has been a dearth 
of lawyers representing noncitizens in immigration court.  Immigration 
judges also have faced tremendous caseloads for years, despite that many 
cases are diverted from the system.  A diverted case receives even fewer 
procedural protections.  On top of all of the problems within the 
administrative adjudication system, Congress has weakened judicial review 
of removal decisions.  The federal courts are handicapped in their ability to 
supervise the state of administrative immigration adjudication. 
President Trump inherited a troubled immigration adjudication system.  
The next Part describes the Trump Administration’s response.   
II.  IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
The Trump Administration is increasing the strains on the already 
troubled immigration adjudication system.  President Trump’s statements 
that he does not think that immigration law needs adjudication and the 
Administration’s policies, both discussed below, are evidence that the 
administration favors a system, if one has to exist, that places the highest 
emphasis on quick removals.  Immigration judges would become the second 
immigration law “prosecutor” in the hearing room, working in tandem with 
the lawyer representing the Department of Homeland Security.  
Immigration judges would cease to provide any check on the work of 
immigration enforcement officials and would be biased in favor of removal, 
no matter what result the law demands in a given case.   
While agency adjudicators have never enjoyed all of the same protections 
provided to Article III judges,79 the Trump Administration is making the 
immigration adjudication system less acceptable and accurate by further 
diminishing the independence of agency adjudicators.  While presidents have 
 
 79 Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 11–12, 14–15 (2018).  The 
exact constitutional parameters of presidential control over agency adjudication are not clear, but 
courts have emphasized the importance of due process to agency adjudication.  Id. at 36–37.  In 
agency adjudication, the President’s control over an agency may be weaker than in rulemaking.  Id. 
at 10–12. 
 
1038 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:4 
more control over agency adjudicators than Article III judges, President 
Trump is seeking total control in a way that delegitimizes the system.80  The 
Administration’s actions are especially concerning given that it is prioritizing 
efficiency and accountability in adjudication, where due process concerns 
weigh heaviest.81  Additionally, a Department of Justice regulation requires 
immigration adjudicators to exercise independent judgment.82   
President Trump has expressed his antagonism to providing noncitizens 
with process and his dislike for investment in process for noncitizens.  
President Trump has said on Twitter: 
We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country.  When 
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, 
bring them back from where they came.  Our system is a mockery to good 
immigration policy and Law and Order.  Most children come without 
parents . . . .83   
Hiring manythousands [sic] of judges, and going through a long and 
complicated legal process, is not the way to go – will always be disfunctional 
[sic].  People must simply be stopped at the Border and told they cannot 
come into the U.S. illegally.  Children brought back to their country . . . .84  
Democrats in Congress must no longer Obstruct – vote to fix our terrible 
Immigration Laws now.  I am watching what is going on from Europe – it 
would be soooo [sic] simple to fix.  Judges run the system and illegals and 
traffickers know how it works.  They are just using children!85 
President Trump also has rebuffed calls to hire more immigration judges.  In 
response to a Republican proposal to add 375 immigration judges, he said, 
“I don’t want judges.  I want border security.  I don’t want to try people.  I 
don’t want people coming in.”86  He also said, “Ultimately, we have to have 
 
 80  ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2–7 (describing the Trump Administration as “exerting 
unprecedented levels of control over immigration judges” and as having “deteriorated public trust 
in the immigration court system”). 
 81 See Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause applies to agency adjudication). 
 82  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2018). 
 83 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329; see also Philip Rucker & 
David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving Undocumented Immigrants of Due-Process Rights, WASH. POST 
(June 25, 2018), https://wapo.st/2luawRl?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.51bb2c1f6116 (discussing 
President Trump’s expressed desire to immediately deport undocumented immigrants without 
providing an immigration hearing). 
 84 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 25, 2018, 5:43 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1011228265003077632. 
 85 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 11, 2018, 9:41 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1017086416176730112. 
 86 Rucker & Weigel, supra note 83; see also Michael D. Shear et al., G.O.P. Moves to End Trump’s Family 
Separation Policy, but Can’t Agree How, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018),   https://nyti.ms/2MBGA1Y (“Mr. 
Trump dismissed as ‘crazy’ a proposal by Senate Republicans to expedite processing of immigrant 
families by hiring hundreds of new immigration judges.”).  
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a real border, not judges.”87  He characterized the Republican proposal as 
adding five or six thousand more judges (it was to add 375).88  He said that 
to add that many judges must involve graft.89  He also questioned the motives 
of at least some immigration lawyers.90 
The Administration’s strategy is comprised of specific actions that 
together result in more individuals in the immigration court pipeline, despite 
an increased use of diversions, while refusing to adequately staff the 
immigration courts, also while forcing existing adjudicators to process cases 
faster with an eye towards removal as a preferred result.  Efficiency and a 
predetermined outcome become the most important goals at the expense of 
accuracy and acceptability. 
The Executive Branch has long had prosecutorial discretion to determine 
if an individual will be placed into removal proceedings.91  A removal 
proceeding officially begins when the Department of Homeland Security 
issues a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) directing the individual to appear in 
immigration court.  The Trump Administration has made every removable 
foreign national a priority for removal and has determined that it will issue a 
Notice to Appear in whatever context whenever possible.92  The 
 
 87 Brett Samuels, Trump Rejects Calls for More Immigration Judges: ‘We Have to Have a Real Border, Not Judges,’ 
HILL (June 19, 2018, 1:25 PM) https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/393031-trump-
rejects-calls-for-additional-immigration-judges-we-have-to-have. 
 88 See Trump Assails Critics of Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2I3wrHY.   
 89 Id.   
 90 Shear et al., supra note 86.  Former Attorney General Sessions described immigration lawyers as 
“using all of their talents and skill . . . to get around the plain words of the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act] to advance their clients’ interests.”  Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Largest Class of Immigration Judges in History 
for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-largest-class-
immigration-judges-history.   
 91 See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2017) (discussing the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law). 
 92 See Memorandum from the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-
602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf (expanding the role of 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in issuing Notices to Appear); see also Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Notices to Appear: More than an Enigma, MEDIUM (July 6, 2018),  
https://link.medium.com/VFmD5fBcOV (explaining that the Trump Administration expanded 
the circumstances under which Notices to Appear should be issued); Lazaro Zamora, Comparing 
Trump and Obama’s Deportation Policies, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/comparing-trump-and-obamas-deportation-priorities/ 
(“[W]hile Trump’s removal policy seems geared to focus on ‘criminal’ aliens, it also vaguely 
references broad sections of immigration law and categories of non-citizens that essentially make 
all unauthorized immigrants ‘priorities’ for removal at any time.  The Trump policy is governed by 
the overarching principle that no group of immigrants will be exempted or excluded from 
enforcement through prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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prosecutorial discretion to decline to issue an NTA functions as a kind of 
reprieve from removal and as a way for the government to prioritize 
adjudication resources.93  The Trump Administration wants more NTAs 
issued, and therefore more cases in immigration court.   
At the same time, however, it is not supporting an adequate increase in 
resources for the immigration courts.  The Department of Justice has been 
hiring immigration judges, but the numbers are not enough to decrease the 
case backlog.94  Instead, the backlog continues to grow.  As described above, 
President Trump rejected the idea of a substantial increase in the number of 
immigration judges.  Instead of hiring an adequate number of immigration 
judges, the Department of Justice implemented case completion quotas for 
immigration judges, forcing faster decision-making.   
As explained above, immigration judges are attorney employees of the 
Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice announced case 
completion quotas for its immigration judge employees as a means of clearing 
the case backlog.95  Case completion metrics are not inherently 
objectionable.  The Administration will use a failure to meet the goals to 
evaluate job performance, however, as opposed to only using the results to 
 
 93 The Obama Administration set prosecutorial priorities that emphasized the prosecution of 
noncitizens with criminal records.  Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Customs & 
Immigration Servs., to ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/ 
releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; see also Zamora, supra note 92 (emphasizing that unlike 
the Obama Administration’s priorities, the Trump Administration’s guidance accords more 
discretion to ICE to determine who to detain and remove and likely enables the agency to focus on 
those who can be most easily apprehended).  
 94 In 2012, there were 264 immigration judges and now there are approximately 400.  LENNI B. 
BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION 
REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 6 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf 
(reporting that the immigration court website listed 264 immigration judges in 2012); Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-
immigration-judge (last visited Apr. 5, 2019)  (stating that there are currently approximately 400 
immigration judges). 
 95 Memorandum from James McHenry, Dir., Exec. Office of Immigration Rev., to Immigration 
Judges (Mar. 30, 2018), https://aila.org/infonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judge-performance-
metrics; Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Delivers 
Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-
immigration-review-legal.  The case completion requirements are one piece of a new evaluation 
system that also demands that immigration judges meet certain remand rates and other 
benchmarks.  For example, to earn a performance rating of “satisfactory,” the immigration judge 
must complete 700 cases per year and have a remand rate of less than 15%.  Additionally, the 
immigration judge must meet at least three of six benchmarks.  The benchmarks require, among 
other things, that immigration judges must: (1) complete at least 85% of detained removal cases 
within three days of the hearing; (2) complete at least 85% of non-detained removal cases within 
ten days of the hearing; and (3) complete 95% of hearings on the initial scheduled date for the 
hearing.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN:  ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES 
(2018), http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf. 
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direct court resources or to influence training programs.96  Immigration 
judges and legal scholars are interpreting the case completion quotas as a 
way to lessen the decisional independence of immigration judges.97   
The new performance evaluation system lessens decisional independence 
because immigration judges are pressured to decide cases faster, knowing 
that their conditions of employment depend on speed.  It will be in an 
immigration judge’s self-interest to deny more cases under the case 
completion quotas because denials are often speedier than grants of relief.98  
Denials often shorten case completion time, while approvals can take longer 
to complete due to security checks or other delays.  For example, the main 
type of relief from removal, cancellation of removal, is limited to 4,000 grants 
per year.99  Once the cap is reached, immigration judges may delay a grant 
to the following fiscal year.100  If deferring a grant is not considered a 
completion,101 then the incentive is to deny the application for relief to earn 
a completion.  This incentive exists even if an immigration judge sincerely 
believes that the individual is eligible for relief from removal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 96 Id.  A judge who receives a negative performance evaluation could face a variety of consequences, 
including mandated training, a denial of a promotion to the next pay grade, or possibly termination 
of employment.  E-mail from Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, to 
author (Mar. 29, 2019) (on file with author).  
 97 Nick Miroff, Trump Administration, Seeking to Speed Deportations, to Impose Quotas on Immigration Judges; The 
Move Risks Undermining Judicial Independence, According to a Union Representing the Judges, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://wapo.st/2JbHzV3?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.0dbf4a8b4f8a; see also Letter 
from author et al., to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://commonwealthlaw.widener.edu/files/resources/letter-to-sessions-immigration-
adjudication-with-s.pdf.   
 98  Immigration courts with higher denial rates tend to complete more cases.  See Beth Fertig, How 
Trump’s Quota Plan Could Punish New York’s Immigration Judges, WNYC (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/how-trump-administrations-new-quotas-could-hurt-new-yorks-
immigration-court/ (explaining that, based on historical data, courts with a history of higher denial 
rates already meet the case completion quotas, while courts with a history of lower denial rates will 
have to speed up to meet the case completion quotas). 
 99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e) (2012).  
 100  Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Immigration Judges, Court Adm’rs, Att’y Advisors & Judicial Law Clerks, & Immigration Court 
Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/oppm17-
04/download. 
 101 According to a memorandum of understanding executed between the National Association of 
Immigration Judges (the immigration judge union) and the Department of Justice, a case is not 
complete if it is waiting for a cancellation of removal cap slot.  Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding the Implementation of New Performance Measures for Immigration Judges (Oct. 3, 
2018) (on file with author). 
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Additionally, the case completion quota system places a large amount of 
discretion in the hands of the Assistant Chief Immigration Judges 
(“ACIJs”).102  ACIJs are supervisory judges.  If an immigration judge will not 
meet the case completion quota or other benchmarks under the metrics, an 
immigration judge may ask his or her ACIJ for a waiver.  While providing 
waivers does provide some flexibility, the placement of the power to grant a 
waiver with the ACIJ is problematic because immigration judges may work 
towards a decisional record that he or she believes will please the ACIJ.    
The quotas arrived shortly after former Attorney General Sessions 
narrowed an immigration judge’s power to administratively close a case.103  
A  common use of administrative closure was to pause a removal case where 
the respondent noncitizen had a collateral action pending (such as an 
application for a green card) that might have affected the outcome of the 
removal proceeding.104  In his opinion addressing administrative closure, 
former Attorney General Sessions explained that the proper way to pause a 
removal case is to grant a continuance.105  He curtailed the use of 
continuances, however, just a few months after his directive on 
administrative closure.106  Following that, he limited the ability of 
immigration judges to terminate cases.107  To compound the situation, the 
case completion quotas contain benchmarks that require immigration judges 
to complete cases on or very close to the hearing date.108  This further 
dissuades immigration judges from issuing continuances or otherwise taking 
 
 102 Id. at FAQ Question 2. 
 103 See In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018) (“[I]mmigration judges and the Board 
may only administratively close a case where a previous regulation or a previous judicially approved 
settlement expressly authorizes such an action.”).   
 104 See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE 
POST-CASTRO-TUM: PRACTICE ADVISORY (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/administrati
ve_closure_post-castro-tum.pdf (describing administrative closure as a “docket-management 
mechanism that immigration judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have used 
for more than three decades to suspend removal proceedings in appropriate cases”). 
 105 See Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 282 (arguing that immigration judges “lack a general authority 
to grant administrative closure,” unlike their expressly conferred power to grant continuances). 
 106 See In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 406 (A.G. 2018) (stating that “the good-cause requirement 
is an important check on immigration judges’ authority that reflects the public interest in 
expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws, as well as the tendency of unjustified 
continuances to undermine the proper functioning of our immigration system” (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.29 (2018))).  Former Attorney General Sessions interpreted that authority narrowly to ensure 
the expeditious adjudication of removal cases. 
 107 See In re S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463 (A.G. 2018) (stating that “[c]onsistent 
with . . . Matter of Castro-Tum, immigration judges have no inherent authority to terminate or 
dismiss removal proceedings” (internal citation omitted)). 
 108 See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Implementation of New Performance Measures 
for Immigration Judges, Benchmarks 1, 2, 5, and 6 (Oct. 3, 2018) (on file with author) (explaining 
the various deadlines and requirements immigration judges must meet and the performance 
evaluation process). 
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time to complete the case in a time that the immigration judge thinks is just.  
Former Attorney General Sessions used his power to certify cases to himself, 
along with the announcement of the case completion quotas, to express his 
desire for more cases to be decided faster under procedures calibrated against 
relief from removal.109    
The Trump Administration is poised to use the power to certify cases to 
the Attorney General at a record rate.  During the first two years of the 
Trump Administration, former Attorney General Sessions certified seven 
cases to himself and Acting Attorney General Whitaker certified two cases.110  
The power was used only four times in the eight years of the Obama 
Administration.111  It was used sixteen times through both George W. Bush 
Administrations.112  The Trump Administration has seized on this power to 
implement changes to long-standing practices that allowed immigration 
judges to slow down a case where fairness demanded it.  
If the message of speed and removal was not clear enough through 
written policies, the Department of Justice sent additional signals when it 
removed an immigration judge from a case to guarantee a desired 
outcome.113  The National Association of Immigration Judges, the union 
 
 109 Former Attorney General Sessions emphasized the importance of efficiency in remarks delivered 
to a new class of immigration judges.  He implied that objections to faster adjudication are 
inherently anti-enforcement and symbolize an “open borders philosophy.”  Jeff Sessions, Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Largest Class of 
Immigration Judges in History for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) (Sept. 
10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-
largest-class-immigration-judges-history.  
 110 See generally In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); In re Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 
(A.G. 2018); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 
2018); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018); 
In re M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469 (A.G. 2018); In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018); S-O-
G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018).  
 111 See generally In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 2016); In re Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015); In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011); In re Compean, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). 
 112 Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney 
General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 858 (2016). 
 113 For examples of news regarding the removal, see Jeff Gammage, Immigration Judges File Grievance Over 
Justice Dept.’s Removal of Philly Jurist Who Delayed Man’s Deportation, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 8, 2018), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/immigration-judges-association-grievance-philadelphia-
steven-morley-removal-deportation-case-20180808.html; Tai Kopan, Immigration Judge Removed from 
Cases After Perceived Criticism of Sessions, CNNPOLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/08/ 
politics/immigration-judges-justice-department-grievance/index.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2018, 
5:49 PM); Max Mitchell, Hear the Audio: ‘Chilling’ Immigration Court Hearings that Led to Grievance Against 
DOJ, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 21, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.law.com/ 
thelegalintelligencer/2018/09/21/hear-the-audio-chilling-immigration-court-hearings-that-led-
to-grievance-against-doj/; Max Mitchell, Immigration Judges’ Union Files Grievance Over Phila. Judge 
Removal, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 8, 2018, 2:43 PM), https://www.law.com/ 
thelegalintelligencer/2018/08/08/immigration-judges-union-files-grievance-over-phila-judge-
removal/?slreturn=20180813194659; Ani Ucar, Jeff Sessions Wants to Remove Immigration Judges Who 
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representing immigration judges, filed a grievance against the Department 
of Justice for removing the immigration judge.114  The grievance claims that 
the immigration judge was removed because the immigration judge was 
exercising decisional independence.  In the case removed from the 
immigration judge, the immigration judge had deferred issuing a removal 
order until he was confident the noncitizen had received notice of his 
hearing.115 
An additional threat to the acceptability of hearings comes from a desire 
to end the Legal Orientation Program.  Former Attorney General Sessions 
announced that he would suspend the program while the Department of 
Justice evaluates it.116  After strong opposition from Congress, former 
Attorney General Sessions changed his mind about the suspension and 
agreed not to suspend the program while it is evaluated.117  This evaluation 
is taking place despite previous government and external studies concluding 
that the program makes the removal process more efficient and lowers 
government costs.118   
Acceptability also is diminished as the Trump Administration creates a 
new type of diversion from immigration court adjudication.  The Trump 
Administration has placed roadblocks in the way of individuals fleeing 
persecution and seeking an asylum hearing in immigration court.  The 
Administration has tightened access to the border with Mexico, artificially 
lowering the number of individuals who may present themselves at the 
border to apply for asylum, and then who receive a hearing.119  It also 
attempted to implement a policy that those who enter the United States 
 
Aren’t Deporting People Fast Enough, VICENEWS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
qvmeyd/jeff-sessions-wants-to-remove-immigration-judges-who-arent-deporting-people-fast-
enough. 
 114 See Mitchell, Immigration Judges’ Union Files Grievance Over Phila. Judge Removal, supra note 113 
(discussing the details of the grievance). 
 115 See Ucar, supra note 113 (including a copy of the grievance).  The grievance also claims that similar 
cases also were reassigned from the immigration judge.  Id. 
 116 See Maria Sacchetti, Sessions Backtracks on Pausing Legal Aid for Immigrants Facing Deportation, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/sessions-backtracks-
on-pausing-legal-aid-program-for-immigrants/2018/04/25/c0d27a12-48cb-11e8-827e-
190efaf1f1ee_story.html (providing background on the decision). 
 117 Id.; see also Tai Kopan, Sessions Resumes Immigrant Legal Advice Program Under Pressure from Congress, 
CNNPOLITICS (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/25/politics/ 
immigration-legal-advice-program-resumed/index.html (stating that former Attorney General 
Sessions made the decision at the request of Congress). 
 118 ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–19 to 5–21.  The Department of Justice appears to be working 
toward a new evaluation of the program that is negative.  See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: COHORT ANALYSIS 4 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1091801/download (finding that the Legal Orientation 
Program increases government costs and does not improve proceeding outcomes).   
 119 STEPHANIE LEUTERT ET AL., ASYLUM PROCESSING AND WAITLISTS AT THE U.S.–MEXICO 
BORDER (2018), https://www.strausscenter.org/images/MSI/AsylumReport_MSI.pdf.  
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illegally are ineligible to apply for asylum.120  Additionally, the 
Administration intends to force asylum applicants who do reach the border 
to remain in Mexico while they wait for a hearing before an immigration 
judge.121  These actions aim to prevent asylum applicants from ever applying 
for asylum or from pursuing their claims.  A system that artificially blocks 
hearings required by law certainly is not acceptable as it does not even 
attempt to accurately adjudicate claims.   
Other changes implemented by the Trump Administration also 
emphasize efficiency at the expense of acceptability and accuracy.  For 
example, former Attorney General Sessions certified an asylum case to 
himself122 and decided that domestic violence victims rarely will be eligible 
for asylum, reversing existing Board of Immigration Appeals precedent.123  
After that decision, former Attorney General Sessions then announced that 
immigration judges are not needed to hear those types of asylum claims since 
he already decided that asylum claims based on domestic violence should 
fail.124  Also, the Department of Justice appears to be sanctioning the use of 
summary denials in asylum cases that do reach immigration court.125  If an 
immigration judge believes that a hearing is not necessary, he or she may 
deny the claim without hearing testimony.   
 
 
 
 
 120 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining the 
policy), appeal filed, No. 18-17436 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018).   
 121 Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cissna 
et al. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf.  Pending litigation challenges 
the legality of the Remain in Mexico policy.  See generally Complaint, Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen 
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-cv-00807), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ 
2019.02.14.0001_compl._for_decl._and_inj._relief.pdf.   
 122 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 323 (A.G. 2018).    
 123 Id.; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, PM-602-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING 
REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
MATTER OF A-B- (2018) (stating the purpose of the asylum statute was not to protect domestic 
violence victims based solely on the relationship with the abuser).  
 124 Id.; Tal Kopan, Trump Administration to Turn Away Far More Asylum Seekers at the Border Under New 
Guidance, CNNPOLITICS (July 12, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2018/07/11/ 
politics/border-immigrants-asylum-restrictions/index.html?__twitter_impression=true (“The 
Trump administration is implementing a new asylum policy at the border that will result in 
potentially thousands of asylum seekers being turned away before they can plead their case in 
court.”);  see generally Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (2018) (enjoining the policy), appeal filed, 
No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). 
 125 Jeffrey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?, LEXISNEXIS (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/ 
2018/06/24/are-summary-denials-coming-to-immigration-court-jeffrey-s-chase.aspx.   
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While the Administration does continue to hire new immigration judges 
(although not enough), some members of Congress have expressed concern 
that the Administration is “using ideological and political considerations” in 
the hiring of immigration judges.126  These members of Congress cited 
information from whistleblowers that “indicates that there may be internal 
communications within [the Department of Justice] discussing the perceived 
immigration policy views of [applicants] not aligning with those of the 
Trump Administration.”127  Such vetting would violate civil service rules and 
certainly works against the administrative law value of acceptability.128    
In short, the Trump Administration is working to put more individuals 
in removal proceedings while also squelching what independence is left in 
that system.  Immigration judges are expected to move faster and to favor 
removal.  Exercises of independent judgment are not welcome.  The Trump 
Administration is pushing a troubled system in the wrong direction.  The 
Administration is not attempting to fix what ails immigration adjudication.  
Instead, it is aggravating longstanding problems and expressing disdain for 
the idea of providing process to noncitizens in removal proceedings.  Its 
vision of immigration adjudication appears to be one where immigration 
judges exist to rubber stamp the decisions of immigration enforcement 
officials and to provide nothing more than a façade of justice.  Such a system 
fails to promote the basic ideals of administrative adjudication. 
III.  IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION 
The Trump Administration’s actions point to a dismal future for 
immigration adjudication.  The Administration’s strategy aims to decrease 
acceptability by undercutting process and devaluing adjudicator 
independence.  The Administration’s actions value efficiency at the expense 
of accuracy.  The state of immigration removal adjudication raises two 
important questions for scholars and advocates to consider.  First, at what 
point is the system bankrupt?  Second, if the system is bankrupt, what 
happens next?   
 
 
 
 126 Letter from Elijah E. Cummings et al. to Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Apr. 17, 
2018), https://cummings.house.gov/sites/cummings.house.gov/files/ 
Dems%20to%20DOJ%20re.%20EOIR%20Politicization.pdf.  
 127 Id. at 1–2.  
 128 See supra note 27. 
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A.  When Should Bankruptcy Be Declared? 
Before the Trump Administration, the immigration adjudication system 
already was seriously flawed.  The major difference is that the Trump 
Administration favors a policy that openly rejects the need for acceptability 
and accuracy.  President Trump has expressed his distaste for process for 
noncitizens.  The Department of Justice implemented a series of policies 
designed to make the system less likely to reach results that favor noncitizens.  
The mission of immigration adjudication now is to remove as many 
individuals as quickly as possible.  There is a strong argument that the Trump 
Administration already has pushed the immigration adjudication system into 
bankruptcy because it no longer pays even lip service to the idea that 
immigration adjudication should be used to promote the rule of law. 
That being said, agency policies do not always filter down to every agency 
employee at full strength.  Immigration judges and members of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals still stand as symbols of the importance of providing 
process to noncitizens.  Removal orders are not the result in every case.  
Justice is still done in some cases. 
The immigration adjudication system purposely was structured to 
provide more independent judgment than simply allowing a front-line 
enforcement officer to decide whether an individual will be removed.129  
Congress placed immigration adjudication outside of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Despite that the system is indeed severely troubled, for 
now, the corps of immigration adjudicators are still an obstacle to the 
outright control the Trump Administration seems to crave.   
Another piece of the calculus is to consider whether the Trump 
Administration wants the immigration adjudication system to be bankrupt.  It 
may be easier to argue to replace a completely hobbled system.  Therefore, 
advocates face a difficult choice whether to continue to support a flawed 
system to keep it afloat in the hope that a later caretaker may act to improve 
it.  On the other hand, what if the existence of the system provides cover to 
the Trump Administration to enact its program to strip the system of 
acceptability and accuracy?  The existence of the system may provide a 
façade of justice that distracts from reality.  In that case, should advocates 
pursue dismantling the system to reveal the Trump Administration’s true 
preferences?  The adjudication system is difficult to defend, because it does 
need radical restructuring. 
 
 
 129 An exception is expedited removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012). 
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B.  Immigration Adjudication Reorganization 
If the Trump Administration will be in charge of immigration 
adjudication reorganization, we can guess what the immigration 
adjudication system would look like.  If we take President Trump at his word, 
he envisions a system that provides no process.  Enforcement officials would 
be given even more power to “bring them back from where they came”130 
without any check or balance provided even by another agency, let alone 
judicial review.  Removals at entry are different from removals after a legal 
entry, but it is hard to imagine that President Trump would champion more 
robust procedural rights for immigrants in the interior who face removal.  
The Constitution may ultimately prevent the Administration’s actions, but if 
we take President Trump at his word, acceptability and accuracy would not 
be major influences for his immigration administrative process design.     
Even if the Trump Administration would not implement the President’s 
vision completely and eliminate all process, it could move the system even 
further away from acceptability and accuracy.  Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, expedited removal could be expanded.  The statute provides 
that expedited removal may be applied to any noncitizen that cannot show 
two years of presence in the United States.131  The statutory limit casts a 
wider net than the current agency rule that applies expedited removal to 
those encountered within 100 miles of the border within fourteen days of 
entry.  While the constitutionality of the statutory limit has never been tested 
because it has never been implemented, an expansion of expedited removal 
seems to fit with the type of non-process the Administration prefers.  
Additionally, President Trump’s attorney general could continue to use 
the power to certify cases to himself at an unprecedented rate to undo 
interpretations of immigration law that favor noncitizens.  By manipulating 
more long-standing interpretations, the Trump Administration could create 
more cases with removal as the outcome. 
Alternatively, the Administration could further test the limits of its control 
over immigration adjudicators.  What if the Administration fires every 
immigration judge with a decision-making record favorable to immigrants?  
What if immigration judges are told to decide removal cases based on paper 
submissions rather than live hearings?  What if the agency rescinds the rule 
that commands immigration adjudicators to exercise independent 
judgment?  What could be done that has not been imagined yet?  Litigation 
would, of course, follow any of these actions. 
 
 
 130 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, supra note 83. 
 131 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2012). 
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There are alternative visions of reorganization.  Prominent organizations 
have called for the creation of an Article I immigration court.132  Such a move 
would increase acceptability by removing immigration adjudication from the 
Executive Branch and letting it run itself, with fair, accurate, and efficient 
adjudication as its goal.133  Reinvigorating judicial review also is important, 
as its provides a way to promote and ensure accuracy, efficiency and 
acceptability within the immigration adjudication system.134 
A blank slate might be desirable, given the current state of immigration 
adjudication.  The problem is that the Trump Administration has indicated 
that it would implement a system that disfavors accountability and accuracy.  
Its ideals advance a system that is fundamentally opposed to the idea of 
process for noncitizens. 
CONCLUSION 
The immigration removal adjudication system has been troubled 
through Democratic and Republican administrations.  President Trump 
inherited a severely flawed system.  Instead of working to improve the 
system’s faithfulness to the administrative process criteria of accuracy, 
acceptability, and efficiency, the Trump Administration is taking steps to 
further undermine the system.  Given President Trump’s express desire to 
provide no process for noncitizens, the time sadly has come to envision what 
immigration adjudication bankruptcy looks like.  At what point should 
 
 132 ABA REPORT, supra note 1; AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: 
PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN 
THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES ES-9 (2010) https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_01251
0.pdf (“The Article I court has been selected as the preferred restructuring option . . . .”); AILA 
Policy Brief: Restoring Integrity and Independence to America’s Immigration Courts, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW. 
ASS’N, (2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-calls-for-independent-immigration-courts#PDF 
(“In order protect and advance America’s core values of fairness and equality, the immigration 
court must be restructured outside of the control of DOJ, in the form of an independent Article I 
court.”); Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, FED. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Article-1-Immigration-Court.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) 
(“Since 2013 the Federal Bar Association has urged Congress to establish an Article I ‘United States 
Immigration Court . . . .’”); Email from A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigrant 
Judges, to Elizabeth Stevens, President, Fed. Bar Ass’n (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.naij-
usa.org/images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_endorses_FBA_Article_I_proposal_3-15-18.pdf 
(endorsing “the Federal Bar Association’s proposed legislation in support of an independent 
Immigration Court”).   
 133 See Jill E. Family, No Agency Adjudication?, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES OF N.Y. (Dec. 18, 2018), 
http://cmsny.org/publications/family-agency-adjudication/ (discussing the benefits of creating an 
Article I immigration court).  
 134 Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 
59 KAN. L. REV. 541, 589 (2011) (“[T]he system still needs judicial review to promote efficiency, 
to perform its oversight role, to lend legitimacy to the system, and to ease immigration law’s esteem 
problem.”). 
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scholars and advocates denounce the system as a farce?  If the system is 
bankrupt, how might the Trump Administration reorganize it?   
